Case 1	19-cv-02036-RGA Document 79 Filed 03/08/21 Page 1 of 33 PageID #: 906
1	IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
2	FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE
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4	ECHOLOGICS, LLC, MUELLER)
5	<pre>INTERNATIONAL, LLC, and MUELLER CANADA, LTD d/b/a ECHOLOGICS,)</pre>
6) Plaintiffs,)
7) C.A. No. 19-2036-RGA v.
8) JURY TRIAL DEMANDED ORBIS INTELLIGENT SYSTEMS, INC.,)
9	and AQUAM USA, INC.,
10	Defendants.)
11	
12	J. Caleb Boggs Courthouse 844 North King Street
13	Wilmington, Delaware
14	Thursday, February 25, 2021 9:02 a.m.
15	Videoconference
16	BEFORE: THE HONORABLE RICHARD G. ANDREWS, U.S.D.C.J.
17	APPEARANCES:
18	MORRIS JAMES, LLP
19	BY: KENNETH L. DORSNEY, ESQUIRE
20	-and-
21	TAYLOR ENGLISH DUMA LLP BY: COBY S. NIXON, ESQUIRE
22	BY: TODD E. JONES, ESQUIRE
23	-and-
24	MUELLER INTERNATIONAL, LLC MUELLER CANADA, LTD
25	BY: CHASON CARROLL, ESQUIRE
	For the Plaintiffs

MS. O'BYRNE: Defendants, Your Honor.

MS. O'BYRNE: James Isbester from Kilpatrick

THE COURT: And who's with you?

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on?

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      Townsend.
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                  THE COURT: Okay.
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                  MR. ISBESTER: Good morning.
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                  THE COURT: Okay. And Mr. Isbester, are you in
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      Atlanta, San Francisco, or someplace else?
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                  MR. ISBESTER: I'm actually in the attic of my
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      garage in Berkeley, California. I'm in the San
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      Francisco area.
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                  THE COURT: Okay. Sorry about the timing of
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      this.
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                  MR. ISBESTER: Oh, not at all.
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                  THE COURT: All right. And I'm sorry --
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                  MR. DORSNEY: Your Honor, it's Ken Dorsney for
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      plaintiff.
                 I dialed in.
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                  THE COURT: Oh, okay. So good morning,
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      Mr. Dorsney.
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                  MR. DORSNEY: Good morning.
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                  THE COURT: And who have you got with you?
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                  MR. DORSNEY: I have Chason Carroll from
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      Mueller's deputy general counsel along with co-counsel Todd
      Jones and Coby Nixon from Taylor English.
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                  THE COURT: All right. So I wanted to have this
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      conference so I could ask a few questions, but also partly
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      so I could see whether there was something I could do to
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      help resolve this amicably. And so I was thinking that
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unless somebody wants to say something first, I would go ahead and ask my questions.

Is there anything anybody wants to say before I do that? I guess not.

MR. JONES: No, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. So plaintiff, and I don't know because there are two gentlemen on the screen, and they don't have names which one is Mr. Jones.

Okay. Mr. Jones, are you the one going to be speaking for your side?

MR. JONES: Actually, Mr. Nixon is. I may jump in, if that's allowable.

THE COURT: Yeah, I have no problem with that.

So Mr. Nixon, okay. So does plaintiff have a good faith belief right now that defendant's product infringes?

MR. NIXON: So the product that Orbis has represented that it is delivering to its customers with the sticker, with an optional sticker covering the antenna, Mueller's willing to dismiss with prejudice as to that particular product and as to the two patents that are asserted in this case.

THE COURT: Okay. So that seems like a slightly different position than I saw in the papers that I looked at. Am I missing something?

MR. NIXON: Really I think -- so the parties, as we indicated in the briefing, discussed for several weeks, negotiated a potential settlement or dismissal of the case. And I think one of the sticking points was the scope of products that would be -- the parties were negotiating it in the context of a covenant not to sue going forward. And so one of the key disputes or impasses was the scope of products that would be subject to that covenant not to sue.

So Mueller, you know, is willing to, again, now have this case dismissed with prejudice or have a covenant not to sue that's limited to the particular product, the current -- I'll just call it the current design with the optional sticker.

THE COURT: So let me just interrupt a second because my understanding is that by operation of law, if you get a non-infringement finding as to a product, that may have collateral consequences down the road for products that are not indistinguishably different or some language like that. But of course, until you have that product, it's hard to tell.

Is my understanding of the law generally right?

MR. NIXON: I think so, Your Honor. Right.

This is an issue we haven't briefed or flushed out entirely, but that is my understanding. I think the language is essentially the same that the second product or the accused

product in a second lawsuit is essentially the same then
claim preclusion would --

THE COURT: Okay. So I'll come back to you, but let me ask Mr. Isbester. Do you have another product that's actually available right now or is the product that's available right now the one that Mr. Nixon just said they were willing to dismiss with prejudice against?

MR. ISBESTER: The only product we have available right now is the one that Mr. Nixon indicated willingness to dismiss with prejudice. And frankly, this was worth teeing up for. That's all we want.

THE COURT: Have I solved the problem?

MR. ISBESTER: You have solved the problem, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Mr. Nixon?

MR. NIXON: So I think if -- part of the negotiations were what Mueller was willing -- if we're going to agree to a dismissal with prejudice, Mueller prefers to eliminate that ambiguity of essentially the same so that we're not -- if there are modifications made to this product down the road such that Mueller thinks, you know, now we've got a different product here, you know, we wouldn't want to be in a fight over whether the product is essentially the same or not.

THE COURT: But you know, the problem with that,

Mr. Nixon, is you can't. You can't eliminate the ambiguity because it depends on what they produce in the future; right? I mean, theoretically, how would -- you know, and maybe that between the two of you, you know, coming to a negotiated agreement, you know, you could come up with something that maybe helped in that regard. But in terms of a disagreement, you know, if I granted the defendant's -- if I let them file a motion for summary judgment, if I granted it, you would be in exactly that position. It wouldn't help you down the road; right?

MR. NIXON: I think if we, you know, agreed to a dismissal with prejudice and had some language in there stating that it's limited to this current product, that would be, you know -- that would, you know, cabin the preclusive effect going forward. That would be better than -- and from Mueller's perspective, that would be better than just either a summary judgment ruling or a dismissal with prejudice full stop.

THE COURT: Yeah, but that's other than to say -- you know, I had this come up in some case a few years back, something very much like this or at least something that, to my memory, was very much like this, and that's what I concluded. The time which is -- you know, it's kind of operation of law what would be precluded down the road. And you know, if you're in a position where you're dismissing

with prejudice against this product, that does have some ripple effect, but it's the exact same ripple effect that would happen if you lost a summary judgment motion on this product. And if, as it seems to be the case, you've concluded that this product doesn't infringe, I think you're trying to get something that is more than what you would get if you just litigated and lost.

MR. JONES: Yeah, I believe you're correct, Your Honor, but we would -- you know, if we're going down the summary judgment route, then we would need a lot of --

THE COURT: Well --

MR. JONES: -- additional discovery. As we said in our papers, you know, we've seen pictures of this product with the sticker peeling off, our customers covering it.

You know, have they gotten certification for this model of their product with the sticker? You know, there are a lot of questions we have that if we were -- if we need to go that route all the way to a summary judgment ruling, then there's a lot we would want to do before we take -- before we concede that we would lose on such a summary judgment.

THE COURT: Well, and I'm not -- I mean, you know, part of the reason that I wanted to have this conference is even if Mr. Isbester thinks the summary judgment would be a slam dunk, it still takes me a lot of time to get to that point. That's leaving aside you all

doing discovery and more contentions of one kind or another, getting experts or whatever.

So you know, the way you're portraying it to me right now, I'm thinking that what you ought to do is -- well, let me just ask one question.

So Mr. Isbester, if the plaintiff dismisses against your current product with prejudice, is it understood that you're not going to be asking for attorneys' fees thereafter?

MR. ISBESTER: I think -- I have no express direction from my client on that point, but Your Honor, that if we could have this matter resolved today, my client would be happy to see this in the rearview mirror and never consider any other claims.

If it goes further, if it does go to summary judgment, whether before or after extensive discovery, I think that question becomes a very real concern because we don't believe that this is a case in which the plaintiff has a good faith basis to believe the product infringes and fees would be appropriate. But if we could get it done today, then I believe that will be the end of the case.

THE COURT: Well, okay. I mean, I guess part of the reason I brought that up was just because it seemed to be, I don't know, maybe implicit in what Mr. Nixon was saying that or had started off by saying was that it would

end upon the filing of a motion to dismiss, and it's good to make sure that we sort of all have the same understanding.

MR. ISBESTER: Your Honor, if I may respond to what Mr. Nixon's (inaudible) --

THE COURT: Okay. So Mr. Isbester, for some reason or another, your connection all of a sudden seems to have gotten not so good.

MR. ISBESTER: Can you hear me now?

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. ISBESTER: Yes. Okay.

The concern seems to be and, you know, to go back to your question just now, the original expectation, at least on our side of the fence, was that once we had provided this discovery, in other words, see that there was no infringement, then the case would be resolved. That would be it. And we weren't looking for fees, or costs, or anything at that point, and it's still our hope that that's the way we can proceed.

The effect of a dismissal without prejudice is dilatory to the company for the reasons we've set forth in the papers. The effect of a dismissal with prejudice is that we would then be applying to any product yet unborn the standard collateral estoppel and res judicata principles that apply to a dismissal with prejudice. And we would be taking on the risk that perhaps new design, if there were

such a thing, was sufficiently different from the old design that we were exposed to claimed infringement.

And conversely, if we stayed within -- the language I have heard is that the term substantially the same for infringement analysis purposes -- if we stayed within that yard, the scope of the dismissal with prejudice would protect the company.

So I don't think there's a need for everybody here today to start going through all the different possible future designs that nobody has contemplated, nobody has brought to market, and try and figure out how to draft language that would limit the scope of a dismissal with prejudice to cover that future design possibility. I think the law provides exactly the cabining that Mr. Nixon is looking for.

THE COURT: You know, my opinion, and perhaps I haven't thought about this enough to even really have an opinion, but my opinion is, and there's always going to be some gray area, and that's something that as in business, the business side of what your two companies do, you have to work around that or you have to contemplate that and take your best shot at it, and whatever happens, happens.

So I guess what I'd like to know, and it kind of goes back to what Mr. Nixon said at the beginning, is it seems to me, based on listening to what you're saying,

everybody's saying, and not considering the actual underlying merits of whether or not Orbis' product infringes or defendant's product infringes because, frankly, I get your two names mixed up. That's what I'm kind of trying to avoid having to do, so I don't really have an opinion about that. I'm just kind of reading off of the way you all are talking.

So what I think is that plaintiff, that you ought to have an understanding, which you can confirm without me being present, that the plaintiff will dismiss the suit against whatever the identified accused product is with prejudice. And defendant is not going to seek any attorneys' fees, costs.

I mean, in other words, this is essentially a settlement. But one of the aspects of the settlement is that, kind of like Mr. Isbester said, is that there's going to be some zone of protection, which is whatever the protection is that comes by law to the defendant's future attempts in this market.

So in any event, I think that's agreeable with Mr. Isbester. Is that agreeable with you, Mr. Nixon?

MR. NIXON: Just a couple points there, and again, you know, we haven't briefed or gotten into the claim preclusion issues here, but there is a recent decision from the Federal Circuit where it says that settling parties

remain free to limit the preclusive effect of a dismissal. There was an argument over the scope of preclusive effect and basically the Federal Circuit kind of faulted one party saying, you know, you voluntarily dismissed. You could have, you know, cabined that preclusive effect in that dismissal, but you didn't. And so that's -- Mueller's approach here is we -- you know, if we're agreeing to a dismissal with prejudice, we would want it to be limited to the two asserted patents at issue in the case and then limited to the current product.

And you know, in terms of who bears the uncertainty going forward, you know, just step back and note that this lawsuit was filed on a product that appeared to -- on the original design of a product that, you know, looks like it would have infringed these patents. If Mueller feels justified in protecting its intellectual property to this lawsuit, Orbis has redesigned the product. After much, you know, discussion, Mueller is willing to agree to this dismissal.

I think going forward there is this concern that the product will be modified either by Orbis or by customers, and we think that, you know, Orbis should bear — if they make design changes that have nothing to do with these patents, then obviously there's no concern. But if there are modifications to further protect the antenna on

the product, you know, we think that product should be fair game and not subject to an argument over is this essentially the same or not.

THE COURT: All right. Well, so I think it's certainly reasonable to say that the lawsuit dismissal is limited to the two patents you have asserted; right?

Do you agree with that, Mr. Isbester?

MR. ISBESTER: Absolutely.

THE COURT: But you know, but I don't understand Mr. Nixon, perhaps it's just lack of imagination on my part, how exactly you would -- would you be proposing to change the law's effect on dismissal with prejudice?

I mean, in other words, there's law out there.

You know, we've all kind of talked about it without knowing precisely exactly what it is or just maybe speaking for myself. You know, I'm not wild about this idea, but I do want to understand what it is you're saying.

How would you say what you're saying? You know, if they -- just tell me.

MR. NIXON: Sure. And again, I think this is ——
I think it would be acceptable and proper, you know, right,
the operation of law is one thing if it was just a dismissal
with prejudice full stop. But if there is language in the
dismissal, you know, limiting it to these two patents and
limiting it to the product shown in Exhibit B, right, you

know, or Exhibit A that we attach, and this is what we were attempting to do in our settlement agreement, last settlement agreement that the parties negotiated was show the product, you know, identify the product as best we can in that filing or in that pleading and say that's the product that with prejudice applies to.

THE COURT: But I guess what I'm wondering is, and I think, again, I'm guessing Mr. Isbester doesn't object to your saying it's this product. But the thing is saying it's this product, unless you're then adding the language, and it's exactly this product, and if you change one comma in it, it doesn't count. Then by saying it's this product, you're in the operation of law that if they do some, you know, substantially the same down the road or not insubstantially different, whatever the standard is, that's going to be covered by your dismissal. Right?

know, we'd like to attach a photo and identify the product specifically, that seems to be not inconsistent with what Mr. Isbester wants. But unless you're saying and the normal Federal Circuit law doesn't apply, there's still going to be some zone down the road that, you know, Orbis can change things and it may -- and if there was a lawsuit, it may be that whatever changes that were made would be, you know, not insubstantially different or whatever the standard is.

Right?

MR. NIXON: I mean, I will say the other thing that we were doing in connection with our settlement agreement, Mueller put in for the ordinance of doubt was describing modifications that shall be deemed a different product basically relating to -- so I think there are some examples that could go in to give some certainty on particular things that we can think of right now.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Isbester, these modifications, or modifications is not the right word.

These things Mr. Nixon is talking about in the proposed settlement agreement where they were saying, as I understand it, if you do "X", that makes that or, you know, I don't exactly know what Mr. Nixon -- obviously, I don't know what was exactly in the settlement agreement. But assuming it said if you do "X", that's not substantially the same, what's your take on that?

MR. ISBESTER: So I think the concern is two-fold. First of all, let me say as a predicate, it's a little unusual for us to be discussing what the parties have proposed to each other by way of settlement. I will try to speak a little bit to the hypothetical situation.

We would not want a resolution of this case that in any way precludes future owners of either Orbis or the business that Orbis is building around the SmartCap from

deriving the benefit of that dismissal with prejudice. In the same way that if there were a summary judgment or a jury verdict upheld, and that type judgment, somebody who later acquired the SmartCap product, either by acquiring just the business or acquiring the entire company, would gain some protection by virtue of that earlier decision. And I think that has been spelled out in the law, and we don't need to try and renegotiate, recreate that scope of the impact of whatever resolution we arrive at here. That's already a legal principle that's well established and clear.

Whenever we start speaking about modifications, we then immediately get into, okay, what is the exact nature of the modification? For example, we know that the sticker is -- I think it's like nine-one-thousands of an inch thick. Is eleven-one-thousands of an inch thick? I don't know.

I don't know where all those modifications might go, and so I worry that in trying to identify modifications in advance, we are creating problems that really can't be solved until we actually know of a modification that the company wants to implement and would have some effect on the patent analysis. And that is why we've simply been saying the law is — there's sufficient protectant on that.

Now, if there were -- if it was dismissed with prejudice, we're limited to just these two patents which I think is absolutely appropriate and just the existing

SmartCap product which would be the product that we would present to the Court for a motion for summary judgment. And if there is some specific modifications that plaintiff has in mind that either is within or constitutes the line in the sand beyond which a new infringement count can be brought then, you know, I think we could work with that. But beyond that, I'm not -- I'm worried that anything we come up with is going to be an incomplete solution and it's just going to be -- simply change the nature of the debate from whether or not there is infringement to whether or not the product complies with the modification language that is provided in whatever dismissal is entered.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you, Mr. Isbester.

Mr. Isbester brought something up that I'm at least somewhat conscious of which is if either side thinks some time after today that I've involved myself too much in talking about your positions or essentially trying to settle this case, you know, just write me a letter, and I'll get it reassigned to a different judge if you're going to go forward and litigate. You know, I don't want to -- you know, I recognize what Mr. Isbester said is a legitimate concern.

So that being said, here's what I think you ought to do. I think you're very close. And maybe this is where you were before you started writing briefs and letters

asking for summary judgment, but it seems to me that the plan ought to be, and I don't think it's going to be resolved today probably, but the plan ought to be, you know, plaintiff dismisses with prejudice as to these two patents against this product. And you ought to spend, you know, a day, or two, or whatever you need debating or talking to each other about whether or not there is some what I think Mr. Isbester called line in the sand.

If there's something you can do that's mutually agreeable to identify what that line in the sand is, okay, well, that would seem like a good thing. You know, whether or not it can be done, I have no idea, and that would be way beyond any useful contribution I could make, I think. And you know, based on what you're both saying, it seems to me that it's in your interest, both sides' interest to resolve this case now. But I think the final step needs to be taken by you all.

And I guess I should say, Mr. Nixon, do you have anything further to add after what Mr. Isbester just said?

MR. NIXON: I do want to give Mr. Carroll, Mueller's representative deputy general counsel an opportunity. I think he wanted to make a comment.

Is that right?

MR. CARROLL: Yes, Coby. Your Honor, if you would allow me to make some quick comments?

1 THE COURT: Sure. Go ahead. 2 MR. CARROLL: First, Your Honor --3 THE COURT: Actually, just hold on a second, because I lost track. What is your name, sir? 4 5 MR. CARROLL: First name is Chason, C-H-A-S-O-N. 6 Last name Carroll, C-A-R-R-O-L-L. 7 THE COURT: Okay. And let me just ask: Mr. Isbester, you don't object to me letting Mr. Carroll 8 9 speak, do you? 10 MR. ISBESTER: No, not at all, Your Honor. 11 THE COURT: All right. Go ahead, Mr. Carroll. 12 MR. CARROLL: Thank you. And first of all, let 13 me say, Your Honor, thank you for participating in this 14 hearing because, you know, we litigate a lot, and I think a lot of cases can be settled without all this hoopla. 15 But I think this case, and the reason Mr. Nixon 16 17 and Mr. Jones are putting these arguments forward is because 18 we feel like this case is about this product, not about this 19 product modified. And we think the onus, and the 20 uncertainty, and the fit of any changes and modifications 21 should be on the defendant, not us, right. And if we get 22 into a settlement agreement where we have substantially 23 similar language or other things of that nature, it puts us 24 in a contract, breach of contract context, not an 25 infringement context. It's a different body of law, and

it's a different damages analysis. It's a completely different issue.

So that's why Mueller is a little hesitant to enter into a settlement agreement with the defendants because we've seen the product. They've made the product that infringes, without a doubt. And we know that they have customers they've talked to about it because we've talked to the same customers, our customers.

So we see things in the future causing us to have to come back to the court if they make modifications. And look, this is business. You know, we have all the attorneys on the phone because you guys live in the legal world. We live in the business world. And it's all practicality. Right.

If they change the thickness of the sticker, first of all, we're not going to know. We're not going to care. But it's -- we know the product they make today, Your Honor, doesn't work. It's not going to work. And they know that it's not going to work. And we see in the future they're going to make a modification which is going to cause an issue and cause us all to come back to court.

So if we look at this product, we're happy to say you're right, the way you make the product today, we're happy to dismiss this case. But as Mr. Nixon said earlier, without us having discovery to see actually what they're

doing behind the scenes, what they're planning to do next year, it's hard for us to say that you're not infringing today. I mean, they could be infringing today, we just haven't seen it because they haven't provided us any discovery for us to look at.

So you know, again, I think the biggest issue we have is we're happy to dismiss this case with these patents on that product. And I understand, Your Honor, you know, the law, if we go through summary judgment and through trial, the law around infringement analysis is slightly different than the analysis around breach of contract. And that's our concern.

So if the defendants are willing to say, hey, this product, let's dismiss this case right now, I'm willing to say right now, we'll go ahead and do that right now. We don't have to negotiate for two days, three days. If they want to say that product as is, I can represent Mueller saying we will go ahead and sign that right now.

But if they want leeway, if they want to change things, if they want modifications and to throw us back into litigation over a breach of contract, that is something that our management just wants to avoid, honestly. That's why we're trying to get this settled.

THE COURT: I have to say Mr. Carroll -Mr. Carroll, can you mute yourself?

MR. CARROLL: Your Honor, you broke up.

THE COURT: There's now my echo, and I'm

thinking that's because you unmuted.

MR. CARROLL: Oh, unmute.

THE COURT: And I'm thinking if you mute, there won't be this echo. So I have to say, Mr. Carroll, it doesn't sound like you and Mr. Nixon are on the same page because I think he's just been asking for what you've just said you don't actually want. And it seems to me that you're more on the same page as Mr. Isbester. Because I'm taking it you don't want to have stuff in a dismissal, you want, or what I think I heard you say, Mr. Carroll, and I apologize if I got it wrong, was you're happy to dismiss against this product on these two patents with prejudice today, end of story. Am I right?

MR. CARROLL: Yes, sir, that is correct, but the issue we have is defendant would like to say they can make modifications that are substantially similar to the product today which that gets us back into the we're going to be back in court next week when they make a modification.

THE COURT: But the way that you have proposed it, they can make modifications next week. And the modifications that they make, you know, then there's a judgment call. First, there's a judgment call on their part about the modifications they make. And then there's a

judgment call on your part about whether those modifications now infringe these two patents or some other patents you have. Right?

MR. CARROLL: Yes, Your Honor, but at that point we're in a breach of contract context, not an infringement context, which is a completely different analysis from a damages standpoint. And you're right, they have to make the judgment. We have to make the judgment. And you know, business people seem to be reasonable. And the reason we filed this case is they offered for sale products that infringe. That's what started this entire thing.

Now, they've recently backed off of that, but nothing stops them from making modifications in the future to create that problem again. So -- and I guess, Your Honor, what I'm trying to say is if we want to get this off your docket, if we want to close this case out, it's very easy. It's very easy for us to say these two patents, your product, and that's it.

And if there's modifications in the future, whether we go through summary judgment, whether we go through settlement, you have the same analysis. The only difference is we can close this out today by agreeing to these terms and be done versus, okay, we can negotiate for days or weeks to get a settlement agreement that is going to have the same ambiguity as we're going to have with the

claim preclusion in a year if they make changes in a year after summary judgment.

So I guess what I'm trying to say is by agreeing to the settlement agreement today saves everybody time and money and puts us in no worse situation than a year or two, four, six after litigation.

THE COURT: All right. So let me turn it back over to Mr. Nixon. Do you have any comment?

MR. NIXON: Yes, Your Honor. I'll try to maybe clarify where Mr. Carroll and I are on the same page. And when Mr. Carroll says, you know, that Mueller is willing to dismiss with prejudice as to these two patents and this product, I think the proposal is a dismissal, not a settlement agreement, but a dismissal that has the language of which with prejudice, but is expressly limited to these two patents and this product such that it cabins the preclusive effect that would otherwise happen as a matter of law.

I think, you know, when Mr. Carroll says we don't want them to have -- we don't want Orbis to be allowed to modify going forward, and they should bear the burden if they modify, whether that's a problem or not, I think what Mr. Carroll is suggesting is rather than having a with prejudice dismissal operate as a matter of law, that preclusive effect, that we would cabin that in this

dismissal as I proposed earlier, have a restricted dismissal limited to this particular product.

THE COURT: But in other words, are you saying that your proposal is to dismiss with respect to this product exactly as it is today and, you know, if there's one comma that's changed, it doesn't apply?

MR. NIXON: Yeah. I think, as Mr. Carroll articulated, if there are changes that -- the burden should be on Orbis to identify what changes it has in mind going forward. You know, we're concerned with this product that they have released right now. And we're fine to dismiss as to that particular product.

THE COURT: But the thing is when you say what changes they have in mind going forward, I assume it's kind of a rolling process. Presumably, they have engineers or the like who have ideas from time to time. And so they may have some ideas now in mind now. They may have some ideas that occur to them tomorrow which is presumably --

MR. NIXON: So we understand that. So, you know, a year from now, they may come up with a design change and that change may have nothing to do with the patent. It wouldn't cause -- now, it may make it so that new -- that that modified product is now outside of the effect of this dismissal, but if it's a change that doesn't relate to the patents then, you know, there's -- Mueller wouldn't care.

There's no harm here.

But that burden should be or that certainty, we think Orbis should bear that. So if they come up with design changes later, it may, you know, take it outside of the effect of this dismissal, but that's, you know --

THE COURT: But I guess in a way, I guess the other thing I'm wondering about is when you say they should have the burden, so to speak, I take it in the normal kind of thing where there's a follow-on product, you have to prove -- the plaintiff would have to prove that it's not substantially similar or whatever the language is? That they have to prove it is substantially similar, is that what you mean?

MR. NIXON: Well, so if we had a dismissal with prejudice full stop, six months from now there's a design change on the product, Mueller accuses it of infringement.

Now, not only, you know, Mueller obviously has the burden to prove infringement, but now there's an issue: Is it covered under the prior dismissal or not? Is it essentially the same? And we -- if Mueller is agreeing to a dismissal right now, we would want to take that dispute off the table. If there's a design change, it's outside of the scope of dismissal, and so now, you know, Mueller obviously still has the burden of proof that it infringes, but there's no argument over whether claim preclusion applies or not.

MR. ISBESTER: Your Honor, may I offer one observation here?

THE COURT: Sure. Go ahead.

MR. ISBESTER: I think we are arguing about issues that lawyers have presented to judges in the past and it's pretty well cleared up. Where there is a dismissal with prejudice in the future product that is somehow modified, plaintiff goes for infringement. Defendants offer that as an affirmative defense, the defense of collateral estoppel or res judicata.

It is then the defendant's burden to demonstrate that the new modified product is within the umbrella of the protection of the previous dismissal. I don't think we need a contract to do that.

THE COURT: Well, and I -- right. So you know, I'm way beyond what I actually know here.

Do you, Mr. Nixon, agree with what Mr. Isbester just said is kind of an analytical framework if there was a subsequent suit down the road?

MR. NIXON: I think that's probably right that it would be defendant's burden to show -- to be a defense on -- you know, the claim preclusion applies. And I think our proposal, you know, it would take that claim preclusion defense off the table. It would -- you know, we're not arguing over whether it's essentially the same or not

because the -- because this dismissal is limited to the product itself and does not encompass essentially the same changes.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. NIXON: So basically it would eliminate that defense. That defense would not be available, that's sort of our...

THE COURT: All right.

MR. NIXON: And I guess, you know, if we're -- I mean, more discussion between the parties probably would be helpful on this because, you know, an alternative to a dismissal with this language would be a settlement agreement with some sort of -- in the context of a covenant not to sue as we were pursuing. Maybe we can make some more progress there. There probably are a couple different ways we can come at it.

MR. DORSNEY: Your Honor, it's Ken Dorsney. If I could chime in just for a minute. It may make sense to spend some time working with the magistrate assigned, I'm not sure if it's Judge Thynge or Judge Burke, to see if we could not hammer out a term sheet to get this case dismissed.

THE COURT: And I don't know who -- I don't know which magistrate judge -- actually, I think it might be -- I don't know. You know --

MR. DORSNEY: Maybe Hall.

THE COURT: -- it doesn't matter. I mean, it doesn't really matter. I do remember because I was skimming through the docket earlier today, and I do remember seeing -- I thought it was assigned to some magistrate judge other than Judge Thynge, but it didn't register any further than that with me.

Well, look, you know, in a way, I feel, you know, I at least better understand why you haven't so far resolved this case. I think it would make sense, both based on what Mr. Dorsney said and what the other counsel have said, to basically give you a further chance to speak to each other and to try to resolve this, whether it's by the dismissal without a settlement agreement, but with at least the understanding that, you know, there's no question about attorneys' fees. In other words, completely resolve it. And maybe you can't do that without it being called an agreement, I don't know.

And you know, it makes sense to me, as

Mr. Carroll has said, that this case ought to be resolved

because it seems like the essence of your dispute is really

about something that doesn't exist right now. And so to

some extent, it seems to me that resolving the dispute

that's before -- that exists now shouldn't be driven by

resolving a dispute that doesn't exist. But --

1 MR. DORSNEY: Your Honor.

THE COURT: Yes, Mr. Dorsney.

MR. DORSNEY: This is Mr. Dorsney again. If I may, in the context of what you just said, the dispute that exists now is confined by the scope of what we were able to investigate in the course of the discovery, the limited discovery that was allowed in the case. So I think that that's the roadblock to some of this is that we'd like the dismissal with prejudice to be confined to the actual scope of the case that we were able to investigate.

THE COURT: Yeah. So what does that mean, Mr. Dorsney?

MR. DORSNEY: As we sit here right now, I think maybe we could try to work out a term sheet or some type of resolution that embodies that scope. If we could do that then maybe we could have the case dismissed with prejudice, and it would be associated with those sort of settlement terms, that settlement agreement.

THE COURT: Okay. Well, the only thing I really -- so I don't really have anything more that's possibly useful, assuming anything that I've said at all has been useful. But what I do think would be good is for you to talk to each other about how you'd like to proceed prioritizing resolving the case, whether it's by settlement agreement, or by dismissal, or whatever it is. It seems to

be a poor vehicle for litigating your disputes.

And perhaps the only other thing I'd say, and this is based on something that Mr. Dorsney just said perhaps, if this is true, and I don't know whether it is or not, but if defendant were in a position to represent that at the current time it has no plans to change the accused products. And you know, you'd obviously have to wordsmith that to say whatever actually was true, that might -- maybe that would help. It seems to be, and I'm not saying

Mr. Isbester actually said this, but it seemed to be kind of implicit that they're working on -- the defendant is selling the product that's accused right now, but I don't know.

So can I just ask that, say, in a week or so, assuming you haven't resolved it in the mean time, just send me a status report or, you know, something. And you know, if the status is you want a new judge, let me know. If the status is, yeah, we're working on it, need another "X" amount of time, that's fine. And if the status is, no, we can't possibly resolve this. We want to go to litigation, but we're happy to have you stay as the judge, you know, just let me know what's happening.

Okay? Is there anything else anybody wants to say before I wish you all a good day?

MR. NIXON: Thank you very much, Your Honor.

MR. ISBESTER: Thank you for your time, Your

1	Honor.
2	THE COURT: All right. Well, listen, let me
3	know what's happening in a week, if I haven't found out
4	somehow before then. And I wish you all luck.
5	All right. I'm going to hang up.
6	(Everybody said, Thank you, Your Honor.)
7	(Videoconference was concluded at 9:58 a.m.)
8	I hereby certify the foregoing is a true and
9	accurate transcript from my stenographic notes in the
10	proceeding.
11	<u>/s/ Heather M. Triozzi</u> Official Merit and Real-Time Reporter
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